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Host & Client force randomness on each other.

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Updated Reserved entry order. Made DataType ID changes easier in future
(this MAY NOT  happen again once in use).
This commit is contained in:
Alex Emmet 2026-06-26 17:08:48 +02:00
commit f4118f28ba
25 changed files with 1032 additions and 667 deletions
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24
CONNECTOR.md
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@ -68,14 +68,24 @@ The host's `accept()` method:
6. Returns `None` if the version is unsupported
7. Returns an `MTPConnection` with the negotiated version otherwise
### Login/Register Handshake (crypto feature)
### Login/Register Handshake
When `require_authentication` is set, the host sends a **greeting** first (host ID, public keys, nonce). The client then responds with either:
When `require_authentication` is set, the parties run a mutually-authenticated
**challenge-response**. The client speaks first with an *unsigned* hello:
- **Login** (`CommunicationType::Identification`, ID 15): client ID, nonce, signature
- **Register** (`CommunicationType::Register`, ID 17): public keys, nonce, signature
- **Login** (`CommunicationType::Identification`, ID 15): version, client ID
- **Register** (`CommunicationType::Register`, ID 17): version, public keys
The host verifies the client's signature, sends a signed response, and the client verifies the host's signature.
The host then issues a fresh random `server_challenge` in a signed `Challenge`
(`CommunicationType::Challenge`, ID 21, carrying `ServerNonce`). The client signs
that challenge, binding its id (login) or public keys (register), and returns a
`ChallengeResponse` (ID 22). The host verifies the proof against the challenge it
issued and sends a signed final response, which the client verifies.
Because the client's proof covers the host-issued `server_challenge` (a one-time
value held only on the accepting task's stack), a captured proof cannot be
replayed on another connection. All signed payloads are domain-separated; see
`mtp::crypto::auth`.
---
@ -116,8 +126,8 @@ Client (v2.0) Host (v0.0, v1.0, v2.0)
| CommValue{ Ident. } |
| Version -> "2.0" |
| Id -> 8765 |
| Nonce -> ... |
| Signature -> ... |
| (unsigned hello; auth |
| challenge follows) |
|----------------------->|
| | registry.negotiate(&[Version(2,0)])
| | -> Some(Version(2,0))