[Fix] Clean
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This commit is contained in:
Alex Emmet 2026-08-18 21:53:02 +02:00
commit b331b9f6a3
No known key found for this signature in database
12 changed files with 433 additions and 75 deletions

View file

@ -916,9 +916,19 @@ mod tests {
let mut signer_public_keys = recipient.public_key_bundle();
signer_public_keys.sig_cl_public_key = signer_public_key;
signed.verify(SENDER_ID, &signer_public_keys, ProtectionPurpose::from(1))?;
signed.verify_with_policy(
SENDER_ID,
&signer_public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(1),
crate::ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
)?;
assert_eq!(
signed.into_verified(SENDER_ID, &signer_public_keys, ProtectionPurpose::from(1))?,
signed.into_verified_with_policy(
SENDER_ID,
&signer_public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(1),
crate::ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
)?,
clear_payload
);
Ok(())

View file

@ -2391,10 +2391,11 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(&encoded[15 + signature_len..], inner);
let decoded = DataValue::from_bytes(&encoded).ok_or("signed value did not decode")?;
decoded.verify(
decoded.verify_with_policy(
0x0102_0304_0506_0708,
&public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(0xA5),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
)?;
assert!(matches!(
decoded.clone().into_verified_with_policy(
@ -2406,16 +2407,18 @@ mod tests {
Err(ProtectionError::SignaturePolicyMismatch { .. })
));
// Verification is non-consuming, so it can safely be repeated.
decoded.verify(
decoded.verify_with_policy(
0x0102_0304_0506_0708,
&public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(0xA5),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
)?;
assert_eq!(
decoded.clone().into_verified(
decoded.clone().into_verified_with_policy(
0x0102_0304_0506_0708,
&public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(0xA5),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
)?,
original
);
@ -2424,10 +2427,11 @@ mod tests {
return Err("expected signed value".into());
};
assert_eq!(
wrapper.into_verified(
wrapper.into_verified_with_policy(
0x0102_0304_0506_0708,
&public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(0xA5),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
)?,
original
);
@ -2503,7 +2507,12 @@ mod tests {
};
wrong_purpose.purpose ^= 1;
assert!(matches!(
wrong_purpose.verify(41, &public_keys, ProtectionPurpose::from(7)),
wrong_purpose.verify_with_policy(
41,
&public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(7),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
),
Err(ProtectionError::PurposeMismatch { .. })
));
@ -2512,7 +2521,12 @@ mod tests {
};
wrong_signer_id.signer_id ^= 1;
assert!(matches!(
wrong_signer_id.verify(41, &public_keys, ProtectionPurpose::from(7)),
wrong_signer_id.verify_with_policy(
41,
&public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(7),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
),
Err(ProtectionError::SignerIdMismatch { .. })
));
@ -2521,7 +2535,12 @@ mod tests {
};
wrong_signature.signature[0] ^= 1;
assert!(matches!(
wrong_signature.verify(41, &public_keys, ProtectionPurpose::from(7)),
wrong_signature.verify_with_policy(
41,
&public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(7),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
),
Err(ProtectionError::InvalidSignature)
));
@ -2530,7 +2549,12 @@ mod tests {
};
*wrong_value.value = DataValue::Str("replacement".into());
assert!(matches!(
wrong_value.verify(41, &public_keys, ProtectionPurpose::from(7)),
wrong_value.verify_with_policy(
41,
&public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(7),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
),
Err(ProtectionError::InvalidSignature)
));
Ok(())
@ -2593,9 +2617,19 @@ mod tests {
let opened = decoded.decrypt(&keyring, ProtectionPurpose::from(2))?;
let mut public_keys = keyring.public_key_bundle();
public_keys.sig_cl_public_key = signer_public;
opened.verify(7, &public_keys, ProtectionPurpose::from(1))?;
opened.verify_with_policy(
7,
&public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(1),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
)?;
assert_eq!(
opened.into_verified(7, &public_keys, ProtectionPurpose::from(1))?,
opened.into_verified_with_policy(
7,
&public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(1),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
)?,
value
);
Ok(())
@ -2629,8 +2663,18 @@ mod tests {
return Err("expected signed outer wrapper".into());
};
assert_eq!(signed.signer_id, 7);
signed.verify(7, &public_keys, ProtectionPurpose::from(1))?;
let encrypted = signed.into_verified(7, &public_keys, ProtectionPurpose::from(1))?;
signed.verify_with_policy(
7,
&public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(1),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
)?;
let encrypted = signed.into_verified_with_policy(
7,
&public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(1),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
)?;
assert!(matches!(encrypted, DataValue::Encrypted(_)));
assert_eq!(
encrypted.decrypt(&keyring, ProtectionPurpose::from(2))?,
@ -2680,10 +2724,11 @@ mod tests {
let mut signer_keys = outer_recipient.public_key_bundle();
signer_keys.sig_cl_public_key = signer_public;
let middle = outer_signed.into_verified(
let middle = outer_signed.into_verified_with_policy(
OUTER_SIGNER_ID,
&signer_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(1),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
)?;
let DataValue::Container(entries) = middle else {
return Err("expected container inside outer signature".into());
@ -2700,10 +2745,11 @@ mod tests {
};
assert_eq!(inner_wrapper.signer_id, INNER_SIGNER_ID);
assert_eq!(
inner_signed.into_verified(
inner_signed.into_verified_with_policy(
INNER_SIGNER_ID,
&signer_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(3),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
)?,
leaf
);
@ -2861,11 +2907,21 @@ mod tests {
let public_keys = keyring.public_key_bundle();
assert!(matches!(
DataValue::Null.verify(1, &public_keys, ProtectionPurpose::from(1)),
DataValue::Null.verify_with_policy(
1,
&public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(1),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
),
Err(ProtectionError::NotSigned)
));
assert!(matches!(
DataValue::Null.into_verified(1, &public_keys, ProtectionPurpose::from(1)),
DataValue::Null.into_verified_with_policy(
1,
&public_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(1),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
),
Err(ProtectionError::NotSigned)
));
assert!(matches!(
@ -2909,7 +2965,12 @@ mod tests {
};
signed.signature[0] ^= 1;
assert!(matches!(
DataValue::Signed(signed).verify(1, &signing_keys, ProtectionPurpose::from(1)),
DataValue::Signed(signed).verify_with_policy(
1,
&signing_keys,
ProtectionPurpose::from(1),
ProtectionPolicy::any_supported(),
),
Err(ProtectionError::InvalidSignature)
));

View file

@ -133,6 +133,10 @@ impl InMemoryReplayGuard {
pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
self.accepted.len()
}
pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
self.accepted.is_empty()
}
}
impl ReplayGuard for InMemoryReplayGuard {

View file

@ -1022,6 +1022,18 @@ mod tests {
Ed25519Signer::new(&keyring.sig_cl_secret_key).expect("Ed25519 signer")
}
fn content_open_options(
metadata: &VerifiedRelayMetadata,
policy: ProtectionPolicy,
) -> RelayOpenOptions {
RelayOpenOptions {
policy,
decode_limits: metadata.decode_limits,
encode_limits: metadata.encode_limits,
protected_limits: metadata.protected_limits,
}
}
// Test-only compatibility shims keep older fixture setup readable while
// routing every invocation to an explicit replay choice in production.
fn open_relay_metadata(
@ -1345,12 +1357,12 @@ mod tests {
)
.expect("final recipient metadata");
assert_eq!(final_metadata.metadata(), Some(&application_metadata));
let final_content = open_relay_content(
let final_content = open_relay_content_with_limits_without_replay(
&final_metadata,
&final_recipient,
&sender.public_key_bundle(),
42,
policy,
&[&final_recipient],
std::slice::from_ref(&sender.public_key_bundle()),
Some(42),
content_open_options(&final_metadata, policy),
)
.expect("final recipient content");
assert_eq!(final_content.content, DataValue::Str("hello".into()));
@ -1393,22 +1405,22 @@ mod tests {
));
assert!(
open_relay_content(
open_relay_content_with_limits_without_replay(
&metadata,
&metadata_recipient,
&sender.public_key_bundle(),
42,
policy,
&[&metadata_recipient],
std::slice::from_ref(&sender.public_key_bundle()),
Some(42),
content_open_options(&metadata, policy),
)
.is_err()
);
let content = open_relay_content(
let content = open_relay_content_with_limits_without_replay(
&metadata,
&final_recipient,
&sender.public_key_bundle(),
42,
policy,
&[&final_recipient],
std::slice::from_ref(&sender.public_key_bundle()),
Some(42),
content_open_options(&metadata, policy),
)
.expect("content");
assert_eq!(content.signer_id, 7);
@ -1416,12 +1428,12 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(content.message_type, "ProtectedMessage");
assert_eq!(content.content, DataValue::Str("hello".into()));
assert!(matches!(
open_relay_content(
open_relay_content_with_limits_without_replay(
&metadata,
&final_recipient,
&sender.public_key_bundle(),
43,
policy,
&[&final_recipient],
std::slice::from_ref(&sender.public_key_bundle()),
Some(43),
content_open_options(&metadata, policy),
),
Err(RelayError::NotFinalRecipient)
));
@ -1512,7 +1524,12 @@ mod tests {
.expect("relay frame");
assert_eq!(
relay_metadata_claimed_signer_id(&frame, &[&recipient]).expect("signer ID"),
relay_metadata_claimed_signer_id_with_limits(
&frame,
&[&recipient],
DecodeLimits::default(),
)
.expect("signer ID"),
7
);
let metadata = open_relay_metadata_with_keys(
@ -1523,12 +1540,15 @@ mod tests {
ProtectionPolicy::from(crate::SignaturePolicy::Ed25519),
)
.expect("relay metadata");
let content = open_relay_content_with_keyrings(
let content = open_relay_content_with_limits_without_replay(
&metadata,
&[&recipient],
&[sender.public_key_bundle()],
Some(42),
ProtectionPolicy::from(crate::SignaturePolicy::Ed25519),
content_open_options(
&metadata,
ProtectionPolicy::from(crate::SignaturePolicy::Ed25519),
),
)
.expect("relay content");
@ -1571,12 +1591,12 @@ mod tests {
)
.expect("relay metadata");
let content = open_relay_content_with_keyrings(
let content = open_relay_content_with_limits_without_replay(
&metadata,
&[&current_content_recipient, &previous_content_recipient],
&[sender.public_key_bundle()],
Some(42),
policy,
content_open_options(&metadata, policy),
)
.expect("previous content recipient key should decrypt");
@ -1680,12 +1700,12 @@ mod tests {
)
.expect("metadata signed by a previous key should verify");
assert_eq!(metadata.matched_signer_key_index(), 1);
let content = open_relay_content_with_keys(
let content = open_relay_content_with_limits_without_replay(
&metadata,
&recipient,
&[&recipient],
&[current_signer_public, old_signer_public],
42,
policy,
Some(42),
content_open_options(&metadata, policy),
)
.expect("content signed by a previous key should verify");
assert_eq!(content.message_type, "ProtectedMessage");